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Abstract. Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional 
and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified 
in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes 
p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. 
Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis is that the subject’s intellectual abilities 
explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this 
proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather 
than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think 
that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) even if we as-
sume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view 
are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox 
view but can be accommodated by it.
Keywords: epistemic justification, propositional justification, doxastic justification, the epistemic basing 
relation, John Turri.
Resumen. Turri argumenta en contra de lo que él llama una visión “ortodoxa” de la relación entre la 
justificación proposicional y doxástica, según la cual (Basis) para que S esté doxásticamente 
justificado al creer que p es suficiente que p esté justificado proposicionalmente para S en virtud 
de tener una razón R y que S crea que p sobre la base de R. Según Turri, (Base) es falsa y, por 
lo tanto, la opinión ortodoxa es errónea. Turri ofrece “una propuesta alternativa”, cuya tesis 
definitiva es que las habilidades intelectuales del sujeto explican por qué una proposición dada, 
p, está justificada para ella, y argumenta que, en contra de la ortodoxia, esta propuesta lleva a 
explicar la justificación proposicional en términos de justificación doxástica en lugar de viceversa. 
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En este documento, defiendo las siguientes afirmaciones: (i) Hay buenas razones para pensar que 
Turri identifica erróneamente “la visión ortodoxa” y, por lo tanto, su objeción falla, (ii) incluso 
si asumimos que la identificación de Turri de la visión ortodoxa es correcta, sus contra-ejemplos 
de esa visión distan mucho de ser decisivos, y (iii) la propuesta de Turri no es “una alternativa” 
a la visión ortodoxa; esta puede ser acomodada por ella.
Palabras clave: justificación epistémica, justificación proposicional, justificación doxástica, la relación 
de base epistémica, John Turri.
1. Introduction
An adequate theory of epistemic justification must be able to account for the 
differences in the epistemic standings of the subjects in the scenarios below: 
Case 1. Last night in her dream, it seemed to Susan as if she were reading an article about 
a civil war in Iraq. Other than this experience, she is entirely clueless about what is actually 
going on in Iraq, and Susan does not (come to) believe that there is a civil war in Iraq. 
Case 2. John reads an article about a civil war in Iraq in a newspaper that is well-known 
for its credibility. However, he simply ignores the information he receives from the article 
and does not come to believe that there is a civil war in Iraq. 
Case 3. Michael reads an article about a civil war in Iraq in a newspaper that is well-known 
for its credibility. Michael comes to believe that there is a civil war in Iraq; however, the 
reason for which he believes that there is a civil war in Iraq is not his having read that 
article but his having had a dream similar to Susan’s last night. 
Case 4. Mary reads an article about a civil war in Iraq in a newspaper that is well-known 
for its credibility. Mary comes to believe that there is a civil war in Iraq, and the reason for 
which she believes that there is a civil war in Iraq is her having read that article.
In cases 1 and 2, neither Susan nor John believes that there is a civil war in 
Iraq. However, John is, epistemically speaking, better situated with respect to the 
proposition that there is a civil war in Iraq than Susan. It might plausibly be said 
that John’s epistemic credentials for the proposition that there is a civil war in Iraq 
are better than Susan’s. While neither has the belief in question, we might still say 
that John has something going for the proposition that there is a civil war in Iraq 
but Susan does not. Examples of this sort can be easily found in the literature, and 
they are usually deployed to draw the moral that we need a notion of epistemic 
justification that applies to pairs of subjects and propositions, regardless of whether 
those subjects believe the corresponding propositions or not; and let us adopt the 
schema A proposition, p, is (epistemically) justified for a subject, S to articulate the 
epistemic relation intended to be captured by this notion. So, the proposition that 
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there is a civil war in Iraq is justified for John but not for Susan.1 It is customary to
call this notion of epistemic justification propositional justification. 
In cases 3 and 4, both Michael and Mary believe that there is a civil war in 
Iraq, and both are equally well situated with respect to the proposition that there is a 
civil war in Iraq. Despite this, Michael’s believing that proposition is epistemically 
defective in a way in which Mary’s is not. It might be plausibly said that Mary’s 
believing attitude in question enjoys a more favorable epistemic standing than 
Michael’s. Examples of this sort are usually deployed to draw the moral that we need 
a notion of epistemic justification that is different from propositional justification 
and applies to pairs of subjects and their actual believing attitudes; and let us adopt 
the schema S’s belief that p is (epistemically) justified to articulate the epistemic 
relation intended to be captured by this notion. So, the proposition that there is a 
civil war in Iraq is justified for both Mary and Michael; however, Mary’s believing 
is justified, but Michael’s is not. It is customary to call this latter notion of epistemic 
justification doxastic justification.
Once the two notions of epistemic justification are clearly distinguished, 
it is natural to ask whether one of these notions can be explicated or otherwise 
accounted for in terms of the other. A standard answer to this question is that 
propositional justification is explanatorily prior to doxastic justification: a 
theory of epistemic justification must first explain propositional justification 
and then explain doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification 
(plus something else). The fact that doxastic justification requires propositional 
justification but not vice versa provides some (prima facie) support for this 
approach. It is uncontroversial that doxastic justification requires at least 
propositional justification and belief; however, as a quick comparison of cases 
3 and 4 above shows, it cannot be plausibly argued that if p is justified for S and 
S believes p, then S’s believing that p is justified: it is simply false that having 
propositional justification for p plus believing that p yields doxastic justification 
for believing p. Rather, there must be a proper connection between S’s believing p 
1 It might be (and has been) argued that the conditions for having propositional justification are stronger 
than what is presupposed here. So, it might be maintained, in order for the proposition that there is a 
civil war in Iraq to be justified for John, he needs to (justifiably) believe that the newspaper in which 
the article appeared is credible as well as having read the article. (Similar remarks might also be 
made about conditions for being doxastically justified.) However, the point of presenting these cases 
is merely to illustrate the generic distinction between propositional and doxastic justification; and for 
the purposes of this paper, the question of what exactly the conditions for propositional and doxastic 
justification can be safely set aside.
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and what makes p propositionally justified for S: the former must be based on the 
latter. According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional 
and doxastic justification, it is necessary and sufficient for a belief that p to be 
doxastically justified for a subject S, that p is propositionally justified for S and 
the belief that p is based on what makes p propositionally justified for S. 
Turri (2010) argues that the orthodox view of the relationship between 
propositional and doxastic justification is mistaken.2 In particular, Turri 
maintains that the following principle, which is entailed by the orthodox view, 
is false:
(Basis) If (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having 
reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is 
doxastically justified (p. 314).
Turri provides two counter-examples to (Basis) and concludes that it (and 
its kin)3 is false. Turri’s counter-examples are designed to show that there are cases 
in which having good reasons r for believing p plus believing p on the basis of 
r does not amount to justifiedly believing p. Turri’s cases exploit what he calls a 
“glaring weakness” in the orthodox view, which does not make any “mention of 
the way in which the subject performs in forming or sustaining a belief” (p. 315). 
The first counter-example —the case of Misses Proper and Improper— purports 
to show that one fails to justifiedly believe p despite having good reasons r for p 
and believing p on the basis of r, when one bases her belief p on r and some other, 
epistemically defective reason d. If one comes to believe p “as the result of an 
episode of explicit, conscious reasoning that features” (p. 316) r and d essentially, 
then one does not come to justifiedly believe p despite the fact that one has good 
reasons (namely, r) for believing p and believes p (partially) on the basis of those 
reasons.4 The second counter-example —the case of Messrs. Ponens and Lacy— 
purports to show that one fails to justifiedly believe p despite having good reasons 
r for p and believing p solely on the basis of r, when one comes to believe p as a 
2 All Turri references that follow are to this work, unless otherwise noted. Kvanvig (2003), Korcz (2000) 
and Feldman (2002) are among the works Turri quotes as defending the orthodox view.
3   Turri offers two revisions on behalf of the orthodox view to (Basis), which he calls (Basis+) and (Austere 
Basis), in response to his own counter-examples (pp. 316-317). For reasons of simplicity, I will take 
(Basis) as a representative of the orthodox view, but nothing much hangs on this choice. 
4   Turri assumes that coming to believe p through an explicit, conscious reasoning from r to p suffices 
for basing the belief that p on r. In this paper, I will adopt Turri’s assumption. 
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result of deploying a patently invalid inference rule while reasoning from r to p.5 
Turri concludes that the orthodox view fails to account for the fact that “the way 
in which the subject performs, the manner in which she makes use of her reasons, 
fundamentally determines whether her belief is doxastically justified” (p. 318).
Turri maintains that what makes the orthodox view susceptible to such 
counter-examples is that it tries “to understand doxastic justification in terms of 
propositional justification” (p. 319). Given the alleged downfall of the orthodoxy, 
Turri moves on to providing a sketch of an “alternative proposal” (p. 319), which 
reverses the direction of explanation and “explains propositional justification 
in terms of doxastic justification” (p. 325). According to Turri’s proposal, “the 
subject’s intellectual abilities explain why she is in a position to justifiedly believe 
p” (p. 320, emphasis original), where the relevant intellectual abilities in question 
involve explicit, conscious reasoning, and where the subject’s being in a position 
to justifiedly believe p (or her being in a position to have a doxastically justified 
belief that p) is taken as equivalent to p’s being propositionally justified for that 
subject.6 More specifically, then, Turri endorses both of the following theses:
(PJ) Necessarily, for all S, p and t, if p is propositionally justified for S at t, then p is 
propositionally justified for S at t because S possesses at t some intellectual abilities 
such that, were S to believe p by performing those abilities, S’s belief would thereby be 
doxastically justified.7 
(R) Propositional justification should be explained in terms of doxastic justification (rather 
than vice versa). 
Turri holds that (PJ) “marks a significant advance in our understanding” 
(p. 325) of propositional justification and that it is a way of fleshing out the more 
basic idea captured by (R). 
This paper is hereafter divided into four sections. In section 2, I will argue 
that Turri makes things too easy on himself by defining “the orthodox view” in the 
way he does: there are good reasons to think that the view that properly deserves 
5   The discussion below will focus on Turri’s second counter-example. As Turri himself observes, there 
is a straightforward response, which appeals to (Austere Basis), to the first counter-example. (Austere 
Basis) is this: “If (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes 
p on the basis of R and only R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified” (p. 317). 
6   Turri’s thesis about the explanatory priority of doxastic justification over propositional justification 
has received considerable interest and been debated by a number of philosophers of knowledge and 
justified belief. See, for instance, Silva (2015), Hamid (2016), and Melis (2017). 
7   My formulation of (PJ) differs trivially from Turri’s (see p. 320). 
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the title “orthodox” cannot be what Turri takes it to be. Section 3 is devoted to 
showing that there are two plausible responses available to the so-called orthodox 
view to Turri’s counter-examples and, therefore, that even if we take it for granted 
that Turri’s conception of the orthodox view is along the right lines, his counter-
examples are far from being decisive. Section 4 challenges a central assumption 
in Turri’s argument against the orthodox view, namely, that (PJ) is an alternative 
proposal to (Basis): I will argue that the two can be simultaneously and consistently 
held and, accordingly, that the orthodox view can stand tall against Turri’s crusade 
by accommodating his main proposal. Section 5 sums up the lesson. 
2. The Orthodox View Properly So Called
Let us start by granting Turri’s plausible point that an adequate account of doxastic 
justification should not neglect the manner in which a given subject makes use of 
her reasons. So, since the manner in which a given subject makes use of her reasons 
presumably pertains to the manner in which she bases her beliefs on her reasons, an 
adequate account of the basing relation should not neglect the manner in which she 
makes use of them. However, let us also note that this point creates a problem for 
the orthodox view only on the supposition that the orthodox view holds (or entails or 
presupposes) an obviously implausible conception of the basing relation, according 
to which the subject bases her belief p on R if she comes to believe p through a 
reasoning process in which R features somehow (in some manner or other) —but 
there is no particular manner or way in which R should feature in the reasoning. I 
doubt that there has been any philosopher that endorses such a crude view as that 
basing p on R consists simply in taking into consideration R in some way or other in 
the process of coming to believe p, let alone that such a view deserves to be called as 
“the orthodox view”. Turri correctly observes that the orthodox view is committed 
to (Basis), but this is not to say that it is therefore (or, simply, also) committed to 
that particular implausible conception of the basing relation. To use one of Turri’s 
own analogies (p. 315), just as we can safely assume that the idea that one can 
have a well built deck by having the right equipment and using it in some way or 
other to perform the job has never been the orthodoxy in carpentry, it also seems 
that we can safely assume that the idea that one can justifiedly believe p in virtue 
of having good reasons for p and utilizing those reasons in some way or other in 
the process of coming to believe p has never been the orthodoxy in epistemology. 
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The point here can be reinforced by making a distinction between two kinds 
of basing: psychological and epistemic. A given subject psychologically bases 
her belief that p on R just in case R is a reason for which she comes to believe 
p. Psychological basing is not cognitively demanding because it only requires 
the subject to utilize a reason in some way or other in order for her to base her 
belief on that reason –not that she utilize it in any specific way. A given subject 
epistemically bases her belief that p on R, on the other hand, just in case R is a 
reason for which she comes to believe p and she utilizes R in an epistemically 
adequate way.8 It is clear that epistemic basing is more demanding than mere 
psychological basing: a given subject might psychologically base her belief 
that p on R without epistemically basing it on that reason but not vice versa. 
The question is now whether we should take the notion of basing in (Basis) as 
psychological or epistemic. It is worth noting that (Basis) does not specify the 
specific conception of the basing relation the orthodox view might be committed 
to, which means that it cannot be rejected out of hand that psychological basing 
captures the orthodox view’s conception of that relation. However, the point is 
that doxastic justification is an epistemic notion and it would be very odd if the 
orthodoxy in epistemology about doxastic justification were to hold that what 
distinguishes doxastic from propositional justification is a sort of non-epistemic 
basing (such as psychological basing). The overt implausibility of that idea 
should give us a pause in our assessment of its attribution to a view that properly 
deserves the title “orthodox,” and (Basis)’s mere silence about the specific sort 
of the basing relation the orthodox view endorses does not by itself justify 
attributing it to the orthodox view characterized by its commitment to (Basis). 
(Basis)’s silence in question is a “glaring weakness”, as Turri calls it, only if it 
8 Here are two quick points about the notion of epistemic basing I have in mind. First, it does not 
exclude the possibility that one might epistemically base her belief that p on a bad reason R1, since 
it leaves open the possibility that the subject might utilize R1 in an epistemically adequate way in the 
process of coming to believe p. As such, the notion of epistemic basing here sits well with a standard 
assumption in the epistemological literature on the relevant notion of basing, viz. that a belief might 
be based on a reason even if that reason is not a good reason for that belief. Second, the notion of 
epistemic basing I have in mind can be further specified in various ways depending on what counts 
as an “epistemically adequate way”. One option is to say that a given subject utilizes R in coming to 
believe p in an epistemically adequate way only if she holds the belief that R is a good reason for p. 
Another is to say that epistemically adequate basing requires the subject to come to believe p on the 
basis of R by deploying an acceptable rule of inference that licenses the move from R to p. The generic 
notion of epistemic basing is silent on such matters.
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signals a commitment to a notion of non-epistemic basing like psychological 
basing, but there is no good reason to think that it signals that. 
It is instructive here to take a look at Firth (1978), where the distinction 
between propositional and doxastic justification is first clearly introduced and 
where, given the widely acknowledged significance of the work,9 we should search 
for what the orthodoxy properly so called might look like. There is a certain 
passage in Firth’s seminal paper that deserves close attention:
S cannot be warranted in believing p unless S arrives at his belief in a way that corresponds, 
in an appropriate way, to the evidential relationships in virtue of which p is warranted 
for S (p. 220).
Here Firth claims, as the talk of appropriate correspondence suggests, 
that there is what one might call a “structural similarity” constraint on doxastic 
justification (on S’s being justified in believing p), a constraint that originates from 
the way in which propositional justification is structured (the evidential relationships 
in virtue of which p is justified for S). The way in which S forms the belief that p 
must be structurally similar to the way in which p is propositionally justified for S. It 
is a fair assumption that the orthodox view properly so-called is at least committed 
to a version of the structural similarity (or “appropriate correspondence”) constraint 
(in any case, I will make this assumption below).
Now there are at least two ways in which one might conceive the structural 
similarity constraint —let me call them the weak conception and the strong 
conception. The weak conception of the structural similarity constraint holds that 
it is necessary and sufficient for a subject to have doxastic justification that the way 
she “arrives at” the target belief follows a path that is structurally similar to the one 
‘laid out’ by propositional justification. Suppose that S is doxastically justified in 
believing that p, and suppose that p is propositionally justified for S partly because 
there is a proposition, R2, available to S that supports R1, which in turn supports 
p. Then the structural similarity constraint conceived along the lines of the weak 
conception entails that it follows from these facts about S that S arrives at the 
belief that p on the basis of an inferential path from R2 to R1 to p.10 The crucial 
9 See, for instance, Foley (1984), Moser (1984), Klein (2007), Smithies (2012). 
10 Compare Moser: “Propositional justification is basic to doxastic justification in the sense that one’s 
having propositional justification is a necessary condition of one’s having doxastic justification. Thus, 
if a person is justified in believing a proposition, then that proposition is justified for him. Doxastic 
justification, roughly speaking, is justification that depends on the manner in which one’s beliefs are 
related to the conditions of propositional justification” (1984, p. 196, emphasis mine). 
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point is that psychological basing does not require the fulfillment of the structural 
similarity constraint conceived along the lines of the weak conception. Suppose 
that the subject arrives at the belief that p through an inferential path from R1 to R2 
to p, where R2 supports R1 but not vice versa. In this case, the structural similarity 
constraint is not satisfied but the subject psychologically bases her belief that p on 
R1 and R2. So, if we understand the structural similarity constraint along the lines 
of the weak conception, then psychological basing cannot be the notion of basing 
that is relevant to the orthodoxy’s understanding of (Basis). 
The strong conception of the structural similarity constraint holds that it is 
necessary and sufficient for a subject to have doxastic justification that the way 
she arrives at the belief that p follow the inferential path that licenses the move 
from R2 to p, assuming that R2 supports p. Suppose that R2 is a conjunction and the 
inference rules that license the move from R2 to p are conjunction elimination and 
modus ponens, but suppose also the subject arrives at p through deriving p from 
R2 by a (blatantly invalid) inference rule according to which any proposition can 
be derived from any other proposition. In this case, the weak similarity constraint 
is, but the strong similarity constraint is not, satisfied; and therefore, we can say 
that S weakly bases but does not strongly base her belief that p on R2. Given that 
strong basing is more demanding than weak basing, the conclusion to be drawn 
is that if we understand the structural similarity constraint along the lines of the 
strong conception, then psychological basing cannot be the notion of basing that 
is relevant to the orthodoxy’s understanding of (Basis).
The point I want to make is that the orthodox view in epistemology concerning 
the relation between propositional and doxastic justification should be conceived as 
committed to a version of the structural similarity constraint and, given that neither 
the weak nor the strong conception of that constraint neglects the manner in which 
the subject reaches the target belief in order for her to be justified, the orthodox 
view cannot be accused of neglecting it either. 
I would like to close this section by clarifying its main point in order to avoid 
some potential misunderstandings. Turri claims that the orthodox view properly 
so called about the relation between propositional and doxastic justification is 
committed to (Basis). For all I have said in this section, Turri’s claim might well 
be true (and I believe it is true). My point is, however, that it is one thing to hold 
(Basis) and it is another thing to hold both (Basis) and a non-epistemic (or merely 
psychological) conception of the basing relation, according to which basing p on 
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R is simply making use of R in some way or other in the process of coming to hold 
the belief that p. Turri attributes both (Basis) and that conception of the basing 
relation to the orthodox view properly so called, and I have argued that there are 
good grounds for thinking that this is a mistake.
3. Two Responses
We can move forward, however, by granting, for the sake of the argument, that 
what Turri calls “the orthodox view” deserves its title thanks to the number and 
influence of its adherents, and also that Turri’s objection that that view neglects 
the manner in which the subject makes use of her reasons does not miss the mark. 
Now, there are two main sorts of response available to the orthodox view thus 
understood on account of the fact that the antecedent of (Basis) is a conjunction 
of two statements, namely (i) and (ii): revise either the conditions for having 
propositional justification or the conditions for satisfying the basing relation (in such 
a way that Turri’s counter-examples are neutralized without dropping the thesis that 
propositional justification is explanatorily prior to doxastic justification). The basic 
idea is that if we had a version of the orthodox view that entails that the conditions 
for having propositional justification or satisfying the basing relation are harder to 
meet than what the original version suggests, then we could reasonably expect that 
Turri’s counter-examples lose their force: if we had such a version endowed with 
stronger notions of propositional justification or the basing relation, we would be 
in a position to say that the subjects that figure in those counter-examples either 
lack propositional justification or do not satisfy the basing relation. 
One way to respond to Turri’s challenge is by working on (ii), i.e. by 
offering a stronger notion of the basing relation. On the orthodox view, as Turri 
defines it, the subject bases her belief p on R if she deploys R in some way or 
other in the process of coming to believe p. Now, consider the following, more 
demanding notion of basing —proper basing: the subject properly bases her belief 
p on R if she deploys R in a proper (or adequate/acceptable/legitimate/reliable) 
way in the process of coming to believe p.11 So, for instance, an explicit process 
of reasoning from R to p that follows an improper (e.g., invalid) inference rule 
counts as basing the belief that p on R but not as properly basing that belief on R. 
Now, the orthodox view can offer a straightforward revision to its initial, crude 
11 It is worth noting that the notion of proper basing resonates well with the strong conception of the 
structural similarity constraint. 
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picture and claim that propositional justification plus the proper basing relation 
amounts to doxastic justification. The move from basing to proper basing is 
clearly not ad hoc, given that a main reason why we feel the need to introduce 
the notion of basing to our philosophical theory of knowledge in the first place 
is our conviction that in order for a subject to know p, she needs not only to 
have good reasons R for believing p and believe p but also to form her belief 
that p by being responsive to R in the right way.12 If mere basing does not do 
the job, then it is natural to offer a stronger notion of basing, i.e. proper basing. 
Furthermore, a revision along these lines has the obvious potential to undermine 
Turri’s counter-examples, especially the seemingly more challenging case of 
Messrs. Ponens and Lacy. Let me call this sort of response to Turri’s challenge 
the proper basing response.13 
The proper basing response is, as the discussion in the previous section 
suggests, what can be straightforwardly gleaned from the standard (or “orthodox”) 
accounts of the relation between propositional and doxastic justification. 
Interestingly, Turri does not address the proper basing response to his challenge 
in any considerable detail. The only relevant comment he makes is this: “I should 
note that Kvanvig [one of the many philosophers Turri presents as a proponent 
of the orthodoxy] at times maintains that the belief must be “properly” based in 
order to count as doxastically justified. But he never explains what “properly” 
amounts to, and often omits it” (p. 313, fn. 1). However, it is clear that Kvanvig’s 
alleged failure to explain the notion of proper basing can only function simply as 
an invitation for further clarification but cannot be treated as dealing a decisive 
blow to the orthodox view. 
In addition to the proper basing response, which works on (ii) (in [Basis]) 
by offering a stronger notion of the basing relation, there is another response that 
works on (i) by offering a stronger notion of propositional justification. The orthodox 
view about propositional justification might be conceived as holding, roughly, that 
if S has a reason R that supports p, then p is justified for S. So, S’s intellectual 
abilities such as her reasoning capacity from R to p (or her capacity to make the 
inferential connection between the two) have nothing to do with whether p is 
12 As Turri himself correctly notes in (2009): “For your belief that Q to be doxastically justified, Q must 
not only be justified for you, but you must believe Q for the right reasons and in the right way” (p. 209, 
emphasis mine). 
13 For a defense of the proper basing response, see Silva (2015). 
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justified for S.14 This is a perfectly legitimate notion of propositional justification, 
but it is a weak one and there is room for a stronger one. Note that the weak notion 
of propositional justification does not accord well with the more fundamental 
idea that having propositional justification for p puts one in a position to have a 
doxastically justified belief that p. And, this is because there might well be a subject 
that has a reason R that supports p but does not have the capacity to reason from 
R to p. If having propositional justification for p puts one in a position to have a 
doxastically justified belief that p, then since such a subject lacking the relevant 
inferential capacity is not in a position to have a doxastically justified belief that p, 
she does not have propositional justification for p despite the fact that she has R.15 
This suggests the following, strong notion of propositional justification: having 
propositional justification for p requires not only having good reasons R for p but 
also the capacity to make the inferential connection between R and p. 
Let us call the response to Turri’s challenge that adopts the strong notion of 
propositional justification the inferential capacity response. The inferential capacity 
response to Turri’s counter-example illustrating the possibility of deploying a 
patently invalid inference rule is that it is not described in enough detail to enable 
us to say whether the subject deploying such an inference is propositionally 
justified. In that counter-example, the subject has good reasons R to believe p but 
the inference she makes from R (and only from R) to p is patently invalid. Turri 
assumes that since she has R to believe p, the subject is propositionally justified 
to believe p. However, the inferential capacity response rejects that assumption 
and protests that Turri’s counter-example is under-described because we are not 
provided with information regarding whether the subject has the capacity to make 
use of a correct inference rule from R to p. 
14 Cf. Pollock and Cruz (1999): “To be justified in believing something it is insufficient merely to have 
a good reason for believing it. One could have a good reason at one’s disposal but never make the 
connection. [In that case] what is lacking is that one does not believe the conclusion on the basis of 
those reasons” (pp. 35-36). 
15 The same point can also be made by noting that one way to put the distinction between propositional 
and doxastic justification is in terms of ‘justifiable’ as opposed to ‘justified’ belief (see, for instance, 
Korcz [2000, pp. 525-526]). To say that p is propositionally justified for S is to say that the belief that 
p is justifiable for S (that is, roughly: were S to believe that p, S’s belief that p would be justified), and 
to say that p is doxastically justified for S is to say that S’s belief that p is justified. If this is so, then 
since the belief that p is justifiable for S only if S has the relevant inferential capacity (to make the 
connection between her grounds and p), p is not propositionally justified for S if S does not have that 
inferential capacity. 
The priority of propositional justificatio
179
Estud.filos  nº 59. Enero-junio de 2019. Universidad de Antioquia.  pp. 167-182. 
ISSN 0121-3628. ISSN-e 2256-358X
The proper basing response and the inferential capacity response agree 
that (Basis) needs to be revised to meet Turri’s counter-examples to the orthodox 
view. The difference between the two is that the former opts for revising (ii) and 
the latter opts for revising the requirements for having propositional justification 
presupposed by (i).16 So, while the proper basing response delivers the result that 
in Turri’s counter-examples, the subjects in question do not properly base their 
beliefs on their reasons, the inferential capacity response delivers the (potential) 
result that they are not propositionally justified to hold those beliefs. Though these 
responses stand in need of further refinement and elaboration, it seems to me that 
they still manage, in their current shape, to tilt the balance in favor of the orthodox 
view in the face of Turri’s counter-examples: these responses neutralize Turri’s 
counter-examples (in their current shape, at least) and thereby stave off his attack 
on the orthodox view. 
4. The Orthodox View and Turri’s Proposal
According to Turri, the correct response to his counter-examples is, as noted 
above, to acknowledge that a given subject’s inferential capacities (or “intellectual 
abilities”) explain why a given proposition is justified for her. This is supposed 
to be captured by the ‘because’ clause in (PJ). Turri assumes in his paper that the 
orthodox view cannot acknowledge this point and is committed to rejecting (PJ). I 
think this is a mistake. There is nothing in (Basis) that requires a rejection of (PJ), 
which means that, contra Turri, (Basis) and (PJ) are not alternative theses about 
the relation between propositional and doxastic justification. 
To see why this is so, it is instructive (and plausible anyway) to think of 
inferential capacities as dispositions to form new beliefs given some other beliefs 
and to think of exercising those inferential capacities in the process of forming new 
beliefs as manifestations.17 Now, just as a glass has a disposition to shatter when 
struck and what explains the actual shattering of a glass in certain circumstances 
is its disposition in question (i.e. fragility),18 a subject might have a disposition to 
16 Obviously, they are not mutually exclusive: both responses can be simultaneously adopted.
17 For a sustained argument for a dispositional analysis of propositional and doxastic justification, see 
Vahid (2016). 
18 I take it that it is intuitively plausible to explain the shattering of a glass in terms of its fragility. After 
all, it is natural to answer the question “Why did it shatter?” by saying “Because it is (was) fragile.” 
This intuitive conception is succinctly captured by Mumford’s following remarks: “Something can 
be disposed to break though it is not broken now. The disposition is thought to be a persisting state 
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form new beliefs given some other beliefs and what explains her actually coming to 
form those new beliefs in certain circumstances is her disposition in question (e.g., 
her mastery of modus ponens). A plausible analogy is, then, that manifestation of 
intellectual capacities is to actual shattering as having those capacities is to fragility. 
If so, (PJ) might be plausibly read as (PJ*):
(PJ) Necessarily, for all S, p and t, if p is propositionally justified for S at t, then p is 
propositionally justified for S at t because S possesses at t some intellectual abilities 
such that, were S to believe p by performing those abilities, S’s belief would thereby be 
doxastically justified.
(PJ*) Necessarily, for all S, p and t, if p is propositionally justified for S at t, then p is 
propositionally justified for S at t because S has at t a particular disposition such that, were 
S to believe p, S’s belief would thereby be doxastically justified. 
Now, let us suppose, for the sake of analogy, that the following thesis captures 
“the orthodox view” about the relation, say, between fragility (a specific disposition) 
and shattering (its manifestation):
(Fragility) If (i) x is fragile, and (ii) x strikes (a suitably solid surface, say, the ground), 
then x shatters. 
(Fragility) is crude and needs massive refinement. But that is not our concern 
in this paper. The point is that (Fragility) is an analogue of (Basis) in the debate 
over the nature of the relation between fragility and shattering, and the question is 
whether an adherent of (Fragility) as such is committed to rejecting a thesis along 
the following lines, which is purported to be an analogue of (PJ*): 
(DM) Necessarily, for all x, and t, if x is fragile at t, then x is fragile at t because x has at 
t a particular disposition such that, were x struck, x would thereby shatter. 
I think it is obvious that (Fragility) and (DM) are not alternative theses: there 
is simply no reason why an adherent of (Fragility) cannot consistently endorse 
(DM). (DM) simply specifies the reason why something is fragile, i.e. why (i) in 
(Fragility) is true when x is replaced by an individual constant. But this by itself 
presents no threat to the adequacy or truth of (Fragility). 
Now, just as (Fragility) and (DM) are not alternative theses, (Basis) and (PJ*) 
are not alternative theses either: 
or condition that makes possible the manifestation” (1998, emphasis mine). For the purposes of this 
paper, the philosophical worries pertaining to the explanatory power of dispositions (see, e.g., Block 
[1990] and Kim [1988]) can be safely set aside.
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(Basis) If (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and (ii) 
S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified.
(PJ*) Necessarily, for all S, p and t, if p is propositionally justified for S at t, then p is 
propositionally justified for S at t because S has at t a particular disposition such that, were 
S to believe p, S’s belief would thereby be doxastically justified. 
(PJ*) specifies the reason why a given proposition is propositionally justified, 
i.e. why (i) in (Basis) is true when p is replaced by a particular proposition. But 
this by itself presents no threat to the adequacy or truth of (Basis).
Moving on to Turri’s (R) and its bearing on the orthodox view, I want to 
make two points (recall that [R] is the thesis that propositional justification should 
be explained in terms of doxastic justification (rather than vice versa)). First, (R) 
is purported to capture the main idea expressed by (PJ) (or (PJ*)); and if, as I 
have argued above, (PJ) (or (PJ*)) is consistent with (Basis), then (R) in the sense 
intended by Turri must also be consistent with (Basis). Second, it is not clear what 
exactly (R) amounts to. However, given that (Basis) is consistent with (PJ) (or (PJ*)) 
and therefore with (R), then, assuming that Turri’s claim regarding the orthodox 
direction of explanation is true, the sense in which that claim is true cannot be the 
sense in which it is inconsistent with (R). 
5. Conclusion
To sum up the entire discussion above, let me present the main lesson in the form of 
a dilemma: either the orthodox view about the relationship between propositional 
and doxastic justification is not what Turri takes it to be, or it is. If the former is true, 
then Turri’s objection misfires. If the latter is true, then Turri’s preferred proposal 
is not an alternative to the orthodox view and can be accommodated by it. In either 
case, the orthodox view remains unscathed. 
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